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I. INTRODUCTION 
A dead body lies in the parking lot of a bar, and a knife lies by the 
body’s right hand.  The window of a car is shattered.  A man stands 
nearby with a gun in his hand.  There are fifteen to twenty people in the 
parking lot, and many more inside the busy bar.  Police, on routine 
patrol, arrive almost immediately. 
The police secure the scene, not allowing anyone to leave.  When 
more officers arrive, they begin interviewing the people in the parking 
lot, including the shooter.  Other officers question patrons inside the bar. 
The shooter tells the officers that he and the dead man were strangers 
and that they had gotten into a fender bender in the parking lot.  After the 
shooter got out of his car, the decedent got out of his car too.  Egged on 
by passengers, the decedent started yelling obscenities, and then, with a 
knife in his hand, charged the shooter.  The shooter pulled the gun he 
was carrying and shot twice, hitting both the decedent and the occupied 
car.  The shooter stated that he was in fear for his life, as the decedent 
charged at him “like an angered bull.”  The shooter’s girlfriend, who was 
in the car with him, and several of the shooter’s friends who were on 
their way to their cars, corroborate this version of events.  In addition, 
several others saw the decedent with a knife running at the shooter, but 
only otherwise heard lots of yelling and gunshots. 
The passengers in the decedent’s car offer a different version of the 
event.  They agree that the fender bender was an accident.  According to 
each of them, the shooter got out of his car with his gun drawn, cursing 
about the decedent’s “drunk ass” driving, making threatening gestures 
with the gun.  The decedent got out with a knife, but only as protection—
he was trying to diffuse the situation.  The people in the car believe that 
the shooter purposefully shot into the car—it was then that the decedent 
rushed the shooter and was shot. 
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The levels of intoxication varied tremendously from witness to 
witness, including the car’s occupants.  People still inside the bar 
remember the two men having a verbal exchange that threatened to get 
violent and that the men’s friends were involved.  The bartender tells the 
police that he ultimately threw a bunch of them out. 
Following the investigation of the case, law enforcement forwards 
reports to the prosecutor, suggesting charges be filed against the shooter.  
The prosecutor reviews all the information and decides that the shooter 
should be charged with felony murder,1 and the underlying felony of 
criminal discharge of a firearm into an occupied vehicle.2 
The shooter decides to proceed to trial on the charges, planning to 
assert self-defense in justification for his action.  When he requests to 
introduce evidence of self-defense, the State objects, citing a relatively 
new Kansas case, State v. Kirkpatrick.3  The defendant objects on due 
process grounds.  The court sustains the State’s objections and the 
shooter is convicted.  On appeal, the defendant raises issues relating to 
the exclusion of the self-defense evidence. 
Is the trial court’s exclusion of self-defense evidence sustainable?  
This Article explores the answer to this question from several angles.  It 
begins with a detailed discussion of Kirkpatrick and a relatively new 
Kansas statute, K.S.A. 21-3219,4 to explain the current relationship of 
self-defense and a forcible felony charge.  Subsequently, the historical 
roots of self-defense are discussed and used to demonstrate that the 
determination of self-defense, as a fact-intensive issue, has been through 
time a question for the jury.  Finally, the Article calls into question the 
constitutionality of the exclusion of evidence, based on the defendant’s 
right to a jury trial and his right to present his defense.  Based on all of 
these considerations, this Article concludes that a defendant must be able 
to present evidence of self-defense to the jury, and the sweeping 
assertion in Kirkpatrick to the contrary is wrong. 
II. STATE V. KIRKPATRICK 
John Kirkpatrick and Garrod Farha went to Mulligan’s Pub in 
Wichita, Kansas, late in the evening of January 22, 2004.5  At the bar, 
                                                          
 1. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401(b) (2007). 
 2. Id. § 21-4219(b). 
 3. 184 P.3d 247 (Kan. 2008). 
 4. § 21-3219. 
 5. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d at 252. 
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they ran into mutual friends, Rob Powers and Thomas Wright.6  Two 
other friends of Powers were also at the bar, Jasen Tedlock and Jake 
Williams.7  The six men stayed at Mulligan’s until closing time, 
approximately 1:45 a.m.8  Powers then invited his five friends and 
several others to come to his apartment.9 
At Powers’s apartment, a conversation among car racing enthusiasts 
became quite loud.10  Powers, worried about disturbing his neighbors, 
asked his guests to quiet down.11  The noisy conversation did not 
subside, and Powers admonished his guests that the next person who 
raised his voice had to leave.12  Thomas Wright was the next person, and 
Powers asked him to leave.13  Wright was not pleased, but he followed 
his host outside.14  Tedlock, Fahra, and Kirkpatrick followed along.15 
While the five men were outside the apartment, Tedlock and Fahra 
started to argue, and Tedlock may have tried to hit Fahra, but actually hit 
Wright.16  A fight ensued, in which Kirkpatrick saw Tedlock draw a 
knife.17  Powers physically restrained Tedlock.18  The argument and 
scuffle stopped only when Williams came outside and took Tedlock back 
indoors.19 
Kirkpatrick, Fahra, and Wright left together.20  Other guests left as 
well.21  Williams and Tedlock stayed with Powers at the apartment.22 
Kirkpatrick, Fahra, and Wright went to Fahra’s apartment and got 
Fahra’s dog, a large pit bull, and his roommate’s gun.  They then 
returned to Powers’s apartment.23  Fahra gave Kirkpatrick the gun.24 
 
                                                          
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Brief of Appellant at 3, Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d 247 (No. 04-93465-5), 2005 WL 2395718. 
 18. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d at 252. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Brief of Appellant, supra note 17, at 3. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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Not surprisingly, there were conflicting accounts of the events that 
occurred upon the return of the three men.  According to Powers, Wright 
had called him twice before the three actually arrived.25  The first call 
was to tell Powers that his face was bleeding; the second was to ask 
Powers to come outside.26  Wright denied talking to Powers, but did 
admit to trying to call, but that Fahra got through to Powers first.27  
Kirkpatrick stated that Fahra and Wright were both trying to contact 
Powers.28  Be that as it may, Powers came outside and spoke with 
Wright, Fahra, and Kirkpatrick.29 
According to Kirkpatrick, Powers and Fahra discussed the earlier 
scuffle in an attempt to smooth over the situation.30  Kirkpatrick thought 
all was well, until he looked through the apartment’s sliding glass door.31  
He testified that he saw Tedlock waving a .45 caliber semi-automatic 
pistol and yelling, “Where is Tom [Wright] at?  Does he want more?”32  
Kirkpatrick knew that Powers had such a pistol.33  Kirkpatrick pushed 
Powers out of the way, went up to the window and told Tedlock to put 
the gun away and that the situation was over.34  He also told the men 
outside that Tedlock had a gun, and Wright confirmed Kirkpatrick’s 
testimony.35 
Kirkpatrick also testified that Tedlock continued to curse, yell, and 
threaten, “I’ll kill you,” while looking at Kirkpatrick.36  Tedlock cocked 
the pistol and moved toward the front door of the apartment.37  
Kirkpatrick fired three shots because he feared for his life and the lives 
of his friends.38  He believed that Tedlock would have come outside and 
shot them.39 
Powers’s version of these events differed.  Powers testified that, 
when he came outside, Fahra was holding the dog.40  Powers asked what 
                                                          
 25. Brief of Appellant, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
 26. Id. at 4. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d at 252. 
 30. Id. at 270 (Nuss, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 270–71. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 271. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 252 (majority opinion). 
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was going on and why had they come back with the dog.41  Powers stated 
that the men did not respond, but that Kirkpatrick pulled the gun from the 
waistband of his pants.42  Powers asked him why he had the gun and 
Kirkpatrick responded that he was representing his “set.”43  Powers asked 
Kirkpatrick for the gun and tried to calm him down.44  Fahra was trying 
to kick down the door.45  Kirkpatrick fired one shot into the door of the 
apartment.46  Powers tried to grab the gun.47  Kirkpatrick shoved Powers 
away and shot twice more into the door.48 
Tedlock testified, basically, that he took no part in this second 
argument.49  He saw a man with a dog outside the apartment.50  As he 
was closing the apartment window he had been looking out, someone 
tried to kick in the door.51  The door did not come open because the chain 
lock was engaged.52  Williams ran to the door, pushed it shut, and threw 
the deadbolt.53  Williams was hit by one of the shots fired through the 
door.54  Williams died from the gunshot wound.55 
During a search of the house, law enforcement found a .45 caliber 
pistol in a closet, under a pile of clean linens.56  The gun was in its case, 
and the magazine was stored in a separate compartment in the case.57  
The facts of the case do not indicate that any testing was done on the gun 
to try to determine if Tedlock had ever handled the gun. 
Kirkpatrick was charged with felony murder, based on the 
underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied 
dwelling, but he was not charged with the underlying felony.58  At trial, 
Kirkpatrick received a self-defense instruction, but did not receive jury 
instructions on lesser included offenses of felony murder.59  He had 
                                                          
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 253.  This assertion was corroborated by Mr. Wright’s testimony.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 252. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 253. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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requested both voluntary manslaughter and reckless involuntary 
manslaughter.60  The trial court denied both requests, stating that there 
was no evidence of an intentional killing as required by voluntary 
manslaughter, and that there was no evidence of recklessness as required 
by reckless involuntary manslaughter.61  Kirkpatrick was convicted by 
the jury and then sentenced to life in prison.62 
On appeal, Kirkpatrick challenged the trial court’s failure to instruct 
the jury on lesser included offenses.63  Kirkpatrick’s claim had two 
interrelated parts.  First, since the trial court had instructed on self-
defense, evidence relating to the defense weakened the evidence of the 
underlying felony, and as a result would have permitted the trial court to 
instruct the jury on lesser included offenses.  Second, giving lesser 
included offense instructions was also supported by the theory of 
“imperfect self-defense,” which also should have been available since the 
jury was instructed on perfect self-defense.64 
The Kansas Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by 
former Chief Justice McFarland, summarized Kirkpatrick’s argument, 
cited the relevant law relating to lesser included offenses in felony 
murder cases, and, as the starting point of the analysis, stated that 
“Kirkpatrick was not entitled to a self-defense instruction” under K.S.A. 
21-3214(1).65  That statute provides that self-defense is not a defense for 
a person who is the aggressor and “[i]s attempting to commit, 
committing, or escaping from the commission of a forcible felony.”66  As 
defined by statute, a forcible felony is “any . . . felony which involves the 
use or threat of physical force or violence against any person.”67  Based 
on case law and statutory construction, the crime of criminal discharge of 
a firearm at an occupied dwelling is a forcible felony.68 
The Court analogized Kirkpatrick’s case to State v. Bell, in which the 
defendant was charged with felony murder and criminal discharge of a 
firearm at an occupied vehicle.69  At Bell’s trial, he requested a self-
                                                          
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.; Brief of Appellant, supra note 17, at 8–11. 
 65. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d at 253–54. 
 66. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3214 (2007). 
 67. Id. § 21-3110(9) (Supp. 2008).  “‘Forcible felony’ includes any treason, murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping, aggravated battery, aggravated sodomy 
and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any 
person.”  Id. 
 68. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d at 254–55. 
 69. Id. 
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defense instruction, but was denied.70  On appeal, the defendant asserted 
as error the trial court’s failure to give the instruction.  In Bell, the 
Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on the basis that criminal 
discharge was a forcible felony and that, applying K.S.A. 21-3214(1), the 
defendant was barred from asserting self-defense when charged with a 
forcible felony.71  The court in Kirkpatrick reasoned that, since 
Kirkpatrick was charged with committing felony murder with an 
underlying forcible felony, he was also not entitled to the self-defense 
instruction he received.72  The fact that Kirkpatrick had produced 
evidence relating to his theory of defense was immaterial. 
Despite the apparent breadth of this analysis, the majority explicitly 
stated that its holding was limited to the facts of Kirkpatrick’s case.73  
The court stated: “[t]he policy behind the statute [K.S.A. 21-3214(1)] . . . 
is well served under the facts of this case.”74  The recitation of facts that 
follows this declaration is confusing in two ways.  First, the court makes 
credibility calls on the conflicting evidence.  The court entirely dismisses 
Kirkpatrick’s testimony about Tedlock’s actions inside and his 
possession of a gun.  Based on these credibility determinations, the court 
also concludes that Kirkpatrick and his friends were “[a]t all times during 
the events in this case . . . the aggressors.”75  As to the credibility 
determinations, those are not up to the court to make.  As to determining 
that Kirkpatrick and his friends were the aggressors, that conclusion does 
not lead to a determination that the policy of K.S.A. 21-3214(1) is met in 
this case.  K.S.A. 21-3214 contains separate provisions for initial 
aggressors and aggressors who try to provoke the use of force in order to 
use force in return.76  The majority appears to have combined the policies 
of all subsections in K.S.A. 21-3214 to come up with its conclusion.  The 
court did not consider whether any of the policies of the other 
subsections of K.S.A. 21-3214 might apply, while making its decision 
rest on the first subsection. 
Justice Rosen concurred in the result of the case, on the basis that the 
facts did not warrant a self-defense instruction and that “Kirkpatrick, 
being the initial aggressor should not have received a self-defense 
                                                          
 70. State v. Bell, 80 P.3d 367, 373 (Kan. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Anderson, 197 P.3d 409 (Kan. 2008). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d at 255. 
 73. Id. at 256. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3214(2)–(3) (2007). 
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instruction from the trial court.”77  Justice Rosen expressly disagreed 
with the “sweeping declaration found by the majority that bars a self-
defense claim by a defendant charged with a forcible felony.”78  On the 
forcible felony issue, Justice Rosen observed that Kirkpatrick was 
engaged in several forcible felonies, including aggravated assault, at the 
time he fired the shots, and that the actual discharge of the firearm, the 
act alleged to have been in self-defense, should not have been the basis 
for barring the claim of self-defense.79  Justice Rosen’s brief analysis is 
fully explored by the dissent. 
The dissenting justices, Justice Nuss, joined by Justice Beier, took 
issue with the majority’s sweeping declaration that “K.S.A. 21-3214(1) 
absolutely bars a self-defense claim once any defendant is merely 
charged with a forcible felony, regardless of the particular facts of a 
case,” arguing that “this declaration produces absurd results, is contrary 
to the legislative purpose, and fails to address contrary Kansas law.”80  
Justice Nuss made several points in dissent.  He noted that there is 
Kansas case law that directly contradicted the majority’s analysis, but 
which was not addressed at all by the majority.81  More importantly, 
Justice Nuss construed the self-defense statutes to bar self-defense “only 
if the accused is already otherwise committing a forcible felony when he 
or she commits a separate act of violence, i.e., in purported self-
defense.”82  In support of this conclusion, Justice Nuss cited many 
Kansas opinions, both recent and older, that analyzed the availability of 
self-defense in the context of a felony murder/underlying forcible 
felony.83  For example, he cited State v. Bell, the case heavily relied on 
by the majority, to illustrate his point.84  The defendant in Bell had 
pursued the victim in a car.  He shot and killed the victim.  The 
defendant sought to assert self-defense, but the trial court denied the 
requested instruction.  Despite the language relied on by the majority, the 
court in Bell ultimately found that there was no evidence to support the  
 
 
                                                          
 77. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d at 273 (Rosen, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 266 (Nuss, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 266, 270. 
 82. Id. at 269. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 269–70 (citing State v. Bell, 80 P.3d 367 (Kan. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by 
State v. Anderson, 197 P.3d 409 (Kan. 2008)). 
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requested instruction.85  In contrast, in Kirkpatrick’s case, there was 
evidence that supported the assertion of self-defense.86 
Justice Nuss also observed that a person asserting self-defense 
generally does not allege that she did not commit the act or acts that 
constitute the crime, but rather offers self-defense as a justification for 
the act.87  If the act was justified as self-defense, the person will not be 
convicted of the crime charged.  The problem, then, with the majority’s 
opinion, is that the actual charging of the forcible felony itself (i.e., the 
act claimed to be in self-defense) will act as a bar to the assertion of self-
defense:88 
Additionally, under the majority’s rationale, the following unfortunate 
situation could occur.  If from A’s house he fires multiple shots at B 
who is walking on the sidewalk, and to protect himself B returns fire 
toward A’s house, killing A, then B can be charged with felony murder.  
The underlying felony would be the forcible felony of discharging a 
firearm at an occupied dwelling, and the State would successfully bar B 
from asserting self-defense.89 
Justice Nuss correctly termed the results that could flow from the 
majority’s opinion “absurd.”90 
III. K.S.A. 21-3219 
Compounding the problems raised by Kirkpatrick is a relatively new 
self-defense statute.  In 2006, the Kansas legislature passed K.S.A. 21-
3219, which confers immunity from criminal prosecution on a person 
who lawfully acts in self-defense.91  “‘Criminal prosecution’ includes 
arrest, detention in custody and charging or prosecution of the 
defendant.”92  Subsection (b) permits the investigation of the use of 
force, “but the agency shall not arrest the person for using force unless it 
determines there is probable cause for the arrest.”93  Finally, subsection 
(c), added in 2007, states that “[a] county or district attorney or other 
prosecutor may commence a criminal prosecution upon a determination 
                                                          
 85. Id. at 255. 
 86. Id. at 270–71. 
 87. Id. at 268. 
 88. Id. at 267–68. 
 89. Id. at 269. 
 90. Id. at 266. 
 91. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3219 (2007). 
 92. Id. § 21-3219(a). 
 93. Id. § 21-3219(b). 
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of probable cause.”94  The application of this statute has not been fully 
tested. 
But, there has been one challenge to the commencement of a 
prosecution.  In McCracken v. Kohl, the defendant was charged with 
several counts of aggravated battery.95  He challenged the filing of 
charges in a state habeas corpus motion,96 claiming immunity under 
K.S.A. 21-3219.97  Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
held that the defendant had not met his burden of proof to show that he 
was entitled to immunity.98  The trial court noted that its ruling would not 
affect whether or not the defendant was entitled to a self-defense 
instruction at trial.99 
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court took up the case on its own 
motion.100  Leaving aside the procedural issues not on appeal, the Kansas 
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the defendant had not met 
his burden of proving immunity.101  The court realized that the statute 
itself had not been challenged and did “not offer any opinion on the 
statute’s provisions or the burden of proof anomalies which it might 
create.”102  The court’s decision left intact the trial court’s observation 
that whether or not a self-defense instruction was to be given at trial was 
not a question answered in this case.103 
IV. K.S.A. 21-3219 AND KIRKPATRICK COLLIDE: UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES? 
K.S.A. 21-3219 anticipates that following an investigation, law 
enforcement and the prosecution will evaluate the facts as gathered and 
make a decision about whether or not a person who committed an act of 
force should be criminally charged or if she was acting lawfully in self-
defense and as a result is immune from prosecution.104  This statute was 
                                                          
 94. Id. § 21-3219(c). 
 95. 191 P.3d 313, 316 (Kan. 2008). 
 96. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1501 (2005). 
 97. McCracken, 191 P.3d at 316. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 318–20. 
 102. Id. at 318. 
 103. See id. at 320. 
 104. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3219 (b)–(c) (2007) (“A law enforcement agency may use 
standard procedures for investigating the use of force . . . but the agency shall not arrest the person 
for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause for the arrest . . . . A . . . prosecutor 
may commence a criminal prosecution upon a determination of probable cause.”). 
08.0_PHILLIPS FINAL 4/24/2009  9:09:05 PM 
2009] SELF-DEFENSE: WHAT’S A JURY GOT TO DO WITH IT? 1153 
no doubt intended to provide even greater protection for those who act in 
self-defense.  In “clear cut” cases of self-defense, as determined by law 
enforcement and the prosecutor, the person who used force will be 
spared the stigma and anxiety of arrest and prosecution.  But how many 
of those “clear cut” cases are there? 
Undoubtedly, there will be cases where, on review by law 
enforcement and prosecutors, probable cause for arrest and prosecution 
will be found and the prosecution will determine that the person is not 
immune from prosecution under K.S.A. 21-3219.  The person will be 
charged, most likely, with a felony that can be classified as forcible, 
since acts of force lie at the heart of self-defense claims.  Under 
Kirkpatrick, if the defendant is charged with a forcible felony, on its own 
or as the underlying felony for a felony murder charge, the defendant 
will not be able to assert self-defense, no matter how controverted the 
evidence.105  By judicial fiat, in a result not explicitly contemplated by 
the Kansas legislature, the traditional affirmative defense of self-defense 
has been severely truncated, if not eliminated entirely.  The authority to 
believe or disbelieve a defendant’s evidence of self-defense will no 
longer rest with the jury, but will rest with law enforcement and 
prosecutors.  Based on the historical and current state of statutory, case, 
and constitutional law, this result is wrong. 
V. HISTORY OF SELF-DEFENSE 
The question of self-defense has historically been a jury question.  
The concept of self-defense, which took on legal significance in the 
twelfth century, was based on the idea that criminal liability should not 
be imposed for a person who is not morally blameworthy.  Believing that 
natural law gave a person the right to protect himself from harm, if a 
person acted in self-defense and not with a guilty mind, an acquittal or a 
conviction of a lesser offense was appropriate.  For the past several 
hundred years, the degree of culpability, if any, was a fact question 
reserved for the jury.  To understand how self-defense evolved and why 
it must remain a jury question, it is helpful to trace the history of criminal 
liability. 
The now-common Latin maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit 
rea—“an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty”106—did 
                                                          
 105. See State v. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d 247, 255 (Kan. 2008). 
 106. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 767 (1974); 
Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law 
Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 635 (1993); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. 
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not exist in primitive English criminal law.  Prior to the twelfth century, 
criminal law was one of strict liability and the reason behind a person’s 
actions was irrelevant.107  By simply committing a proscribed act, a 
person was held criminally liable.108  Thus, a man who killed an intruder 
to protect his family from certain death would receive the same 
punishment as the intruder would have received had the man stood by 
and permitted the intruder to kill his family.109  It was not until the 
Normans invaded England, bringing with them European notions of 
criminal liability, that England began to ponder the notion of strict 
liability.110 
During the twelfth century, a resurgence in scholarship brought the 
principles of Roman and canon law to the forefront, which began to 
slowly influence the law of strict criminal liability.111  Ideas and legal 
terms from the Roman Code and Digest, which carefully considered the 
mental element of the crime, seeped into the writings of English common 
law scholars.112  The teachings of the church, that a guilty mind must be 
scrutinized as closely as the physical act, began to shape secular laws.113 
Canon law had long incorporated an emphasis on the guilty mind.  In 
597, the writings of St. Augustine evidenced the development of mens 
rea.  In addressing the crime of perjury, St. Augustine concluded that 
                                                                                                                       
L. REV. 974, 974 (1932). 
 107. Gardner, supra note 106, at 651–52; Sayre, supra note 106, at 979–81. 
 108. See Sayre, supra note 106, at 979–80; see also Paul E. Raymond, The Origin and Rise of 
Moral Liability in Anglo-Saxon Criminal Law, 15 OR. L. REV. 93, 117 (1936).  Raymond finds 
evidence for the strict liability concept as late as 1118.  Id. at 95.  Quoting from a group of Anglo-
Saxon laws, Raymond writes: “It is the law: one who does wrong unknowingly must suffer for it 
knowingly; for in this case a man cannot render an oath by law, that somebody has not been farther 
from life or nearer to death because of this act.”  Id. 
 109. Sayre, supra note 106, at 979–80.  See also Raymond, supra note 108, at 96, wherein he 
postulates that perhaps reasons for disregard of intent in the very early history of English common 
law include (1) the difficulty of obtaining and evaluating proof, (2) the fact that criminal and civil 
law were not divided so that there were no tort remedies available, and (3) the lack of conception of 
the court as an impartial authority. 
 110. CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND 
THE LAW 31 (1989).  Although not all scholars agree that self-defense was exclusively the result of 
the invasion of the Normans, as Gillespie seems to claim, it is not disputed that European notions of 
culpability came with the Normans to England. 
 111. See id. at 31–33.  See also Raymond, supra note 108, at 102, wherein Raymond notes that 
early writings of the Norman period were not really laws, so much as collections of essays that 
demonstrated the “spirit of the times.”  Of interest here are the “laws” of William I: “If somebody 
kills another for blood vengeance or by self-defence he may not take anything of the dead, not his 
horse, helmet, sword, or any money; but he may cut in pieces his body as is customary to do with the 
slain.”  Id. at 103 (quoting Leges Henrici Primi, 83, 6). 
 112. Sayre, supra note 106, at 982–83 (noting that Sir Henry Bracton borrowed heavily legal 
terms and maxims directly from the Roman notions of dolus and culpa, thereby sparking new 
examination of these legal concepts). 
 113. Id. at 983. 
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“‘[n]othing makes the tongue guilty, but a guilty mind.’”114  This passage 
translates: “[r]eum linguam non facit nisi mens rea.”115  By simply 
removing the word “linguam,” St. Augustine’s belief in the necessity of 
an evil mind was applied to all criminal conduct.116  The need for an evil 
mind or motive was also reflected in the issuance of penance, which was 
proportional to the state of mind of the sinner.117 
Once canon law began to influence secular law, the Anglo-Saxon 
church became a powerful influence in the progression of the common 
law, albeit slowly at first.  During the thirteenth century, as judges 
wrestled with the tension between strict liability and the morality of 
condemning a person who acted in self-defense, a shift in punishment 
occurred through the use of the king’s pardon, which was formalized in 
the Statute of Gloucester in 1278.118  According to the statute, if self-
defense was an issue in a homicide, the offender was tried, and if the jury 
determined that the offender committed the offense, he was convicted.  
Questions were then put to the jury as to whether the killing was 
committed “by misadventure or in self-defense” or by “‘malice 
aforethought.’”119  If the jury deemed the killing to be in self-defense or 
by misadventure, the offender was entitled to seek a king’s pardon.120  
Thus, the man who killed the intruder to protect his family from certain 
death may have been guilty of murder and convicted, but his life could 
be spared through the king’s pardon.121  In the course of time, the 
granting of pardons became such a matter of course that for the sake of 
                                                          
 114. Raymond, supra note 108, at 110–11.  Raymond explains that St. Augustine’s writings 
were significant in that his writings consistently established the doctrine that an “evil motive makes 
the evil act, and good motive the good act.”  Id.  Thus, the crime of perjury was not based simply 
upon the words uttered, but the “inclination of the mind toward falsehood.”  Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Sayre, supra note 106, at 983.  Sayre later notes that while judges were largely swayed by 
the teachings of the church in deciding whether the state of mind of the offender resulted in a finding 
of guilt, the judges drew the line at physical conduct.  See id.  Despite the teachings of the penitential 
books that a guilty mind is sufficient to have sinned, judges did not find criminal liability based 
simply on the state of mind without corresponding conduct, or actus rea.  See id. 
 118. Id. at 995; see also GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 33. 
 119. Sayre, supra note 106, at 995–96; see also GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 33 (“[I]n all cases 
of homicide in which accident or self-defense was an issue, the accused still had to be tried and, if 
found responsible for the death, convicted of murder.”). 
 120. Sayre, supra note 106, at 995–96; see also GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 33; Thomas A. 
Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200–1600, 74 MICH. L. REV. 413, 428 (1976).  
Thomas explains that because self-defense rules were rigid, requiring the offender to be facing 
certain death, jury verdicts included a response that “the defendant ‘could not otherwise have 
escaped death.’”  Id. (quoting C 260/13, no. 5 (1302)).  Judges would sometimes question whether 
the juries did indeed find that the defendant could not have escaped certain death without physical 
retaliation.  Id. 
 121. See Sayre, supra note 106, at 980; Gardner, supra note 106, at 655. 
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expediency, juries were allowed to directly return not guilty verdicts and 
thus bypass the king’s pardon.122 
While struggling with the tension between strict liability and a guilty 
mind, questions of malice or moral blameworthiness began to appear.  
Henry Bracton123 began to develop the notion of malice within the 
framework of the guilty state of mind necessary for punishment.  
Bracton, in writing about arson, began to use words such as 
“premeditated” or “wickedly.”  Believing that a crime was not 
committed unless an intent to injure existed, Bracton wrote: “we must 
consider with what mind (animo) or with what intent (voluntate) a thing 
is done, in fact or in judgment, in order that it may be determined 
accordingly what action should follow and what punishment.”124 
Bracton’s belief that moral blameworthiness was essential to guilt 
paved the way for self-defense to emerge as an affirmative defense.  
Bracton’s discussions of self-defense and criminal culpability focused on 
two questions: (1) did the offender intend his conduct, and (2) did the 
purpose behind the conduct render him blameworthy.125  In the event that 
the offender killed only because he reasonably believed the victim was 
going to kill him, he was absolved from liability.126 
The degrees of blameworthiness were later reflected in the changes 
in homicide law during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth 
centuries.127  As mens rea became more important, homicides became 
                                                          
 122. Sayre, supra note 106, at 996; see also Green, supra note 120, at 430–31.  Green traced one 
jail delivery role covering the years 1351 to 1353 wherein 21 of 68 defendants committed a 
homicide in self-defense.  Id. at 430.  Another role from 1351 to 1366 stated that 19 of 32 homicides 
were committed in self-defense, while a role from 1366 to 1371 said that 59 of the 157 homicides 
were in self-defense.  Id.  Finally, on a role from 1377 to 1385, 24 of the 199 homicides were in self-
defense.  Id.  However, of those 199, only 2 additional defendants were convicted of felonious 
homicide.  Id.  Green does caution that the statistics should be loosely relied on as it is impossible to 
tell the frequency of acquittal when self-defense was not alleged.  Id. 
 123. Sir Henry Bracton was a cleric and judge whose writings heavily influenced development 
of common law.  Gardner, supra note 106, at 655. 
 124. Sayre, supra note 106, at 985 (citing 2 BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDIRIBUS 
ANGLIAE 101b (George E. Woodbine ed., 1922)). 
 125. Gardner, supra note 106, at 661 n.125.  Here Gardner discusses Bracton’s view of self-
defense as perhaps reflecting the “orthodox” Anglo-American view that culpability is a two-step 
process that focuses on the intent to act and the blameworthiness of the act.  Id.  This explanation of 
self-defense aligns with an excuse theory.  Gardner notes that perhaps we are wiser to address the 
issue as one of justification and not excuse.  Id.  The doctrine of excuse is generally reserved for 
those actions where the offender did not possess moral blameworthiness or the requisite mens rea.  
Id.  Justification on the other hand does not negate mens rea, but the actus rea or the act.  Id.  In other 
words, justification theory states the intentional act was not criminal.  Excuse theory is more 
appropriately relegated to the defenses of insanity or compulsion where the state has an interest in 
labeling the conduct illegal, but due to the absence of mens rea, the conduct is excused.  See id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Sayre, supra note 106, at 994–97. 
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separated by degrees based on the intent and seriousness of the 
conduct.128  The first official statement addressing an acquittal by the 
jury based on self-defense came in 1532 with Enactment 24 of Henry 
VIII.129  Prior to 1532, a convicted person who acted in self-defense and 
received a king’s pardon still suffered the loss of property, goods, or 
chattel.130  Based on King Henry VIII’s statute, a person could now 
defend his person and his home without fear of conviction or of losing 
his property, goods, or chattel.131  By the seventeenth century, when 
English common law was being recorded by the scholars of the time, 
mainly Edward Coke and Matthew Hale, self-defense could absolve the 
offender of all criminal and civil penalties.132 
While in its infancy, America turned to English common law to lay 
the groundwork for our legal system.133  It was at this time that England 
began to publish judicial opinions and William Blackstone drafted the 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.134  Blackstone’s treatise was the 
first publication that comprehensively set out the common law of 
England, and, being the only treatise of the day, it served as the only law 
book for the early American lawyers and judges.135  According to 
Blackstone, there were essentially two situations in which self-defense 
arose: the right of a person to defend himself, others, and his property 
from a sudden unprovoked attack, and the right of a person involved in a 
confrontation to defend himself.136  The second of these situations was a 
fact intensive inquiry that focused on whether the offender (1) was 
                                                          
 128. Id. at 995. 
 129. Rollin M. Perkins, Self-Defense Re-Examined, 1 UCLA L. REV. 133, 138 (1953).  Perkins 
explains that while Hale believed the statute to be “declarative,” Sir Michael Foster, in 1762, drew a 
sharp distinction between defensive killing of the one who started the attack and defensive killing 
which became necessary in the course of a “chance-medley.”  Id.  Thus, three questions arose: (1) 
was the offender entirely free from fault?; (2) was there mutual combat where the adversary 
unexpectedly escalated the fight?; and (3) did the initial aggressor, who disengaged, retreat to the 
point that his back was against the wall?  Id. at 138–39. 
 130. Id. at 142. 
 131. Id. at 138 n.30. 
 132. GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 33; see also Perkins, supra note 129, at 143.  Perkins focuses 
on Hale’s discussions and notes that homicide se defendo would still not completely absolve the 
offender of criminal liability.  See also Gardner, supra note 106, at 669 (explaining that “in 1628, 
Coke defined murder as the unlawful killing of another with ‘malice fore-thought’” (quoting 
EDWARD COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 47 (1641))).  It is interesting to note that first-degree murder 
under Kansas law does not require that malice be established, only that the homicide was 
premeditated and intentional.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (2007). 
 133. GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 39–40. 
 134. Id. at 40; see also Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II—Honest But 
Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 465 (1987) (discussing an early 
American judicial decision that relied solely on Blackstone). 
 135. GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 40. 
 136. Id. 
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engaged in mutual combat, (2) was the initial aggressor, and/or (3) 
retreated “to the wall.”137 
According to Blackstone, the first tenet of common law occurred 
when the offender was an innocent victim of a completely unprovoked 
violent attack or other felony crime.  In such an instance, the victim had 
no obligation to retreat—and perhaps even a duty not to retreat.138  
Because the prevention of the felony by the victim was seen as a part of 
his or her duty, the prevention of the felony was justified.139 
The second tenet of self-defense involved mutual combatants where, 
during a quarrel, A and B entered into a physical fight which escalated to 
the level of use of deadly force.  In the event that both A and B had 
access to deadly force and the killing occurred without a disengagement 
from the fight, the killing was chance-medley and the offender was guilty 
of manslaughter.  In the event that A retreated before, but was pursued 
and killed B in self-defense, the homicide was se defendo and A was not 
criminally liable.140 
Blackstone’s, and to some degree Hale’s, writings on self-defense 
law were utilized by the early American courts.141  Recorded cases from 
the nineteenth century are replete with examples of self-defense relying 
on common law rules.  In 1886, L.B. Horrigan and Seymour D. 
Thompson published a volume addressing self-defense in a five volume 
set of defenses in criminal law.142  Of interest, for the purpose of this 
Article, are the chapters addressing the availability of self-defense when 
the offender is engaged in mutual combat and when the necessity for 
self-defense is produced by the offender. 
A review of the cases from the nineteenth century reveals that while 
the early court drew upon the tenets of common law self-defense for 
guidance, the courts held defendants to a high standard and self-defense  
 
                                                          
 137. Singer, supra note 134, at 471–72; see also GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 38–40 
(discussing the medieval origins of self-defense and Blackstone’s adoption of and changes to the 
doctrine).  Singer provides an exhaustive discussion of the availability of self-defense when the 
offender was mistaken about the need for deadly force.  See generally Singer, supra note 134.  While 
mistake of fact is not the focus of this Article, Singer’s discussion of common law self-defense is 
helpful. 
 138. Singer, supra note 134, at 472. 
 139. Id. at 471–72. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. 1 L.B. HORRIGAN & SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, DEFENCES TO CRIME: THE ADJUDGED 
CASES IN THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH REPORTS WHEREIN THE DIFFERENT DEFENCES TO CRIMES 
ARE CONTAINED (San Francisco, Sumner Whitney & Co. 1885). 
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was not an easy path to acquittal.143  To begin, there was a distinction 
between justifiable and excusable homicide: 
In the case of justifi[ed] self-defence, the injured party may repel force 
by force in defence of his person, habitation, or property, against one 
who manifestly intends and endeavors by violence or surprise, to 
commit a known felony upon either . . . . 
 [I]t is justly considered that the right in such case is founded in the 
law of nature, and is not, nor can be, superseded by any law of 
society.144 
A homicide could be excused, although only barely,145 when a 
mutual quarrel precipitated the killing.  In those instances, whether the 
offender was the aggressor or not, if the conflict escalated so that the 
offender’s life was in danger, the offender must retreat as far as he could 
before the law would excuse the killing of his adversary.146  In the event 
that the offender committed the homicide se defendo or failed to retreat, 
the offender was guilty of manslaughter.147 
                                                          
 143. Singer, supra note 134, at 471–74.  Singer provides a good argument that early American 
courts misunderstood the two basic tenets of common law self-defense, which resulted in a 
confusion of whether a mistake of fact could prevent a successful defense.  Id.  According to Singer, 
the failure to appreciate the different types of self-defense introduced the reasonable person standard 
into American jurisprudence.  Id.  At common law, if the offender was mistaken about the facts—for 
example, it was discovered after the homicide that the victim was not armed—self-defense would 
still acquit the offender as they had no evil motive in killing.  Id.  Under early American 
jurisprudence, and in current Kansas statutes, the offender’s belief that the use of deadly force was 
necessary must be reasonable.  An objective standard is applied to reasonableness such that if the 
offender’s mistake of fact is not reasonable, he is criminally liable. 
 144. Commonweath v. Riley & Stewart (Boston Mun. Ct. 1837), in REPORTS OF CRIMINAL 
CASES, TRIED IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, BEFORE PETER OXENBRIDGE 
THACHER 471 (Horatio Woodman ed., Boston, Little & Brown 1845), reprinted in HORRIGAN & 
THOMPSON, supra note 142, at 156. 
 145. Perkins, supra note 129, at 138; see also Singer, supra note 134, at 473. 
 146. Perkins, supra note 129, at 138; see also Singer, supra note 134, at 473.  Singer takes issue 
with whether the early American courts continued to appreciate the difference between justifiable 
self-defense and excusable self-defense.  Id.  In the end, however, both Singer and the current 
authors agree that present day self-defense statutes abolish the distinction and treat justifiable and 
excusable all the same.  As the focus of this Article is that self-defense should be resolved by the 
jury, we simply acknowledge the different position without further discussion. 
 147. Singer, supra note 134, at 473; see also GILLESPIE, supra note 110, at 42.  Gillespie points 
to the introduction of the Colt revolver as a change in the perceptions about self-defense: it was not 
“manly” to shoot another man, and “‘[r]eal’ men, brave men, faced each other, eyeball to eyeball, 
and had it out in a fair fight.”  Id.  In Commonwealth v. Riley & Stewart, reprinted in HORRIGAN & 
THOMPSON, supra note 142, at 161–62, the court set forth the following law of mutual combat or 
aggression: 
There is a species of self-defence known to the law, which, though involving fault to a 
certain extent, is yet excusable.  The killing in such case is voluntary, the party having the 
intention to kill, or to do some great bodily harm at the time the death happened at least, 
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In Stoffer v. State,148 the defendant, armed with a knife, pursued 
Webb with the intent to kill him.149  When Webb returned the attack, the 
defendant retreated to the house of a stranger and closed the door.150  
Webb and his brother pursued the defendant, throwing rocks at the door 
and yelling “kill him!”151  When the two forcibly opened the door, the 
defendant stabbed and killed Webb.152  The trial court charged the jury 
that it could convict of manslaughter as the defendant was a mutual 
combatant, but refused to instruct that the killing of Webb could be 
excusable.153  The appellate court reversed for the failure to instruct the 
jury on the law of acquittal.154  The court held that evidence existed, 
which if believed, supported a finding that the defendant had abandoned 
the conflict and retreated, not just to the wall, but behind it.155 
Although it may be obvious in Stoffer that the initial aggressor had 
sufficiently ended his assault and retreated, other cases are not so 
obvious.  In Vaiden v. Commonwealth,156 the deceased and Vaiden were 
at Vaiden’s house where a marriage was to take place.157  Vaiden and the 
deceased were playing cards when an altercation ensued based on the 
                                                                                                                       
but to have done it for the preservation of his own life.  It arises from a sudden casual 
affray commenced and carried on in the heat of blood; and supposes that the person when 
engaged in such sudden affray, quits the combat before the mortal wound is given, and 
retreats or flies as far as he can with safety; and then, urged by mere necessity, kills his 
adversary for the preservation of his own life.  This last supposed case borders very 
nearly upon manslaughter; and in fact and experience, the boundaries are in some 
instances scarcely perceivable; but in consideration of law they have been fixed.  In both 
cases, it is supposed that passion has kindled on each side, and that blows have passed 
between the parties; but in the case of manslaughter, it is either presumed that the combat 
on both sides has continued to the time the mortal stroke was given, or that the party 
giving the stroke was not at that time in imminent danger.  He, therefore, in the case of 
mutual conflict, who would excuse himself upon the ground of self-defence, must show 
that before a mortal stroke was given, he had declined any further combat, and retreated 
as far as he could with safety; and also that he killed his adversary through mere 
necessity, and to avoid his own immediate death.  If he fails in either of these 
circumstances, he will incur the penalty of manslaughter. 
Id. 
 148. 15 Ohio St. 47 (1864), reprinted in HORRIGAN & THOMPSON, supra note 142, at 213, 
overruled by Mead v. McGraw, 19 Ohio St. 55 (1869).  
 149. Id. at 214. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 214–15. 
 154. See id. at 220 (“We think the Court erred in refusing to give each of the instructions 
requested, and also in the instructions given . . . .”). 
 155. See id. at 219. 
 156. 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 717 (1855), reprinted in HORRIGAN & THOMPSON, supra note 142, at 
222. 
 157. Id. at 222. 
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deceased’s belief that Vaiden was cheating.158  Vaiden’s wife reminded 
the deceased that there was to be no “fuss[ing]” that night and the 
deceased agreed.159  He left the house, but remained in the yard enraged 
and cursing.160  Vaiden picked up his gun and headed for the door.161  At 
the urging of his wife, Vaiden set the gun down and left the house.162  
The deceased, who had left his gun behind, asked for his gun and it was 
handed out of the house by Vaiden’s wife.163  The deceased then left.164 
About 200 yards from the house, the deceased stopped to talk to 
Vaiden’s son.165  As Vaiden approached, the deceased “suddenly 
exclaimed ‘yonder comes the d____d old rascal, and I’ll frail him 
now.’”166  The deceased “jumped over the fence, clubbed his gun about 
half-way of the barrel, and rushed” Vaiden.167  Vaiden told him to stop or 
he would shoot, but the deceased did not stop.168  As the deceased struck 
Vaiden twice with his gun, Vaiden shot and killed the deceased.169 
The question presented was whether the deceased was the initial 
aggressor, and, if so, had he removed himself from the quarrel 
sufficiently to have ended the quarrel.170  The jury was also asked to 
resolve whether Vaiden sufficiently retreated to avoid further 
confrontation with the deceased or whether he re-initiated the conflict.171  
Although the court mentions that Vaiden may have approached to protect 
his son, it points to the testimony that the son and the deceased seemed to 
be conversing quietly.172  Because facts existed that supported the jury’s 
finding—that the defendant did not sufficiently retreat from the 
deceased’s second act of aggression—the appellate court refused to 
overturn the jury verdict and absolve Vaiden of all culpability.173 
                                                          
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 223. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. (“[I]t can scarcely be said that the homicide here occurred in the course of a sudden 
brawl or quarrel.”). 
 171. See id. at 222 (“Before a party thus assaulted, however, can kill his adversary, he must have 
retreated as far as he safely could to avoid the assault . . . .”). 
 172. Id. at 223. 
 173. See id. at 224 (“I think it very difficult to say that he was free from fault . . . .”).  The 
appellate court also noted the testimony given that Vaiden allegedly told others that the deceased 
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Much like self-defense issues that arise today—the questions of who 
was the aggressor and whether the initial conflict ended or whether the 
initial aggressor had sufficiently retreated from the conflict—were also 
the focus of older cases deciding criminal liability.174  Although modern 
self-defense statutes do not focus on justifiable or excusable homicide, 
but rather on self-defense and imperfect self-defense, the questions 
remain the same: who is blameworthy, and was the conduct justified by 
the facts surrounding the event? 
The definition of self-defense in instances of mutual combat, or 
where the initial aggressor claims self-defense, has changed with the 
passage of state statutes and refocusing of policy.175  There are, however, 
still three threads that have consistently run through the doctrine of self-
defense for the last several centuries.  First, self-defense was, and is, 
incredibly fact specific.  Whether the conduct is considered justified or 
excused pivots on small, but crucial, facts.  Such parsing of the fine 
details is still used to determine if the conduct was reasonable.176  
Second, because facts drive the level of culpability, self-defense, like all 
fact questions, remains with the jury.  The failure to instruct on self-
defense requires a new trial when evidence is presented, which if 
believed by the jury, would constitute self-defense.177  Third, the ability 
of a defendant to plead his lack of culpability based on self-defense is 
firmly entrenched in criminal law jurisprudence. 
VI. KANSAS STATUTES AND CASE LAW 
As territories became states with independent governing bodies, the 
common law was codified by the state legislatures.  In 1969, Kansas 
dispensed with the General Statutes Annotated and adopted the Kansas 
Statutes Annotated.  Current principles of criminal liability are contained 
                                                                                                                       
should have been killed years ago.  Id.  The court found this piece of evidence significant in 
determining that Vaiden was not completely blameless.  Id. 
 174. Even the facts were the same—fights over property, affairs, and territory. 
 175. The law today does not advocate for “real men” to fight fair.  See GILLESPIE, supra note 
110, at 42. 
 176. See State v. Ordway, 934 P.2d 94, 102 (Kan. 1997) (stating that there was evidence the 
defendant believed the use of force was necessary to defend his children but “[t]here [was] no 
evidence or even contention that his belief was reasonable”). 
 177. See State v. Benham, 23 Iowa 154, 161 (1867) (arguing the jury should have been 
instructed on the elements of self-defense to properly decide the case); see also Stoffer v. State, 15 
Ohio St. 47, 49 (1864) (ordering the judgment reversed and remanded because the court refused to 
allow the jury to consider self-defense), reprinted in HORRIGAN & THOMPSON, supra note 142, at 
215, overruled by Mead v. McGraw, 19 Ohio St. 55 (1869) (stating that the circumstances necessary 
to establish self-defense were present and “the jury should have been instructed to consider these 
circumstances” (construing Benham, 23 Iowa 154)). 
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in Article 32 of Chapter 21.  As the Kansas courts interpret and apply the 
statutes, some of the basic principles of common law and the rules 
applied in the nineteenth century still exist. 
The analysis of self-defense begins with K.S.A. 21-3211, which 
authorizes the use of force to protect one’s self or others.178  The statute 
is divided into two parts.  Subsection (a) states that “[a] person is 
justified in [using] force when and to the extent it appears to such person 
and such person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend [against another’s] imminent use of unlawful force.”179  
Subsection (b) permits the use of deadly force if the person “reasonably 
believes [that] deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or 
great bodily harm.”180  A key element of the statute is whether the use of 
force, whether deadly or not, was reasonable.  Only if the jury finds the 
belief reasonable is the offender entitled to an acquittal.  If the jury 
determines the belief is not reasonable, the homicide would be classified 
as manslaughter.181 
                                                          
 178. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3211 (2007). 
 179. § 21-3211(a). 
 180. § 21-3211(b).  Similarly, K.S.A. 21-3212 permits a person to defend his home or occupied 
vehicle from unlawful intrusion as is reasonably necessary.  Id. § 21-3212.  The property owner is 
allowed to meet force with force as long as the property owner’s belief that a third party is 
attempting unlawful entry into his dwelling or vehicle was reasonable.  Id.  The same holds true for 
the use of deadly force.  Id.  A property owner can meet deadly force with deadly force as long as 
the property owner’s belief in imminent death or great bodily harm is reasonable.  Id. 
 181. Compare State v. Ordway, 934 P.2d 94, 100–01 (Kan. 1997), with State v. Decklotts, 19 
Iowa 447 (1865), quoted in State v. Kennedy, 20 Iowa 569 (1866), reprinted in HORRIGAN & 
THOMPSON, supra note 142, at 112 n.h.  In State v. Decklotts, the deceased and some of his 
companions were “out for a spree” on Christmas Eve when they stopped by the saloon owned by 
Decklotts.  HORRIGAN & THOMPSON, supra note 142, at 112 n.h.  After drinking at the saloon, the 
party left and proceeded to visit other saloons.  Id.  During the course of the evening, the deceased 
and his companions learned that Decklotts accused the deceased of stealing tumblers.  Id.  Late that 
evening the deceased and his companions returned to Decklotts’s saloon.  Id.  The saloon, part of 
which was Decklotts’s house and a grocery store, “was still open.”  Id.  It is in dispute whether the 
deceased and company broke in or if the saloon was unlocked.  Id.  They confronted Decklotts about 
the accusation of stealing tumblers while Decklotts was behind the counter.  Id. at 113.  A quarrel 
ensued and the deceased accosted Decklotts.  Id.  It is disputed whether the deceased was reaching 
for his breast pocket for a weapon when Decklotts shot the deceased.  Id.  Decklotts was 
subsequently convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to sixteen years in prison.  Id. at 115. 
In affirming the conviction, the appellate court emphasized that although the deceased and his 
companions were the aggressors, Decklotts was not permitted to use deadly force: 
The occurrence is truly a most unfortunate one.  The conduct of the deceased was highly 
blameworthy.  He it was that provoked the difficulty, instigated, doubtless, by the liquor 
which he drank, and to the use of which he became a victim.  The only mitigation his 
conduct finds, if it finds it at all, is in the fact that he was intoxicated, and in part by 
liquor sold him by the defendant.  It would not do to hold that a saloon keeper may sell a 
man that which steals away his senses, overthrows his judgment and clouds his reason, 
makes him boisterous, quarrelsome and offensive; and then, himself being in no serious 
danger, shoot him dead because he is unreasonable, insulting and quarrelsome. 
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Based on K.S.A. 21-3211, the Kansas Supreme Court applies a two 
prong test for determining when self-defense is applicable.182  The first 
prong is subjective and merely asks whether the defendant “sincerely 
believe[d]” that the use of deadly force was necessary to protect himself 
or another.183  The second prong employs an objective test and asks 
whether the defendant’s sincere belief was reasonable.184  Under the 
objective prong, the defendant must be able to show the existence of 
facts that would support his belief.185  If the evidence exists, then the trial 
court must instruct on self-defense.186 
The reporters contain numerous cases deciding whether evidence 
existed that would support a self-defense instruction.  In some instances, 
the court has deemed that there is no evidence and the failure to give a 
self-defense instruction was not erroneous.187  Other cases hold the 
opposite.  It is important to note, however, that in all the cases, the court 
cites to the same language for the level of proof: “the test is not how 
much [evidence there is] but is there any.”188  In the event that there is 
any evidence, even though it may be “slight and may consist solely of the 
defendant’s own testimony,” the jury must be instructed on self-
defense—even if it is not requested.189  Whether the evidence is 
sufficient to establish self-defense is then a question for the jury.190 
State v. Hill191 involved a fight that took place at a crowded bar in 
Wichita.  Upon entering the bar, there was a long, dark hallway filled 
with about twenty-five people trying to get in or out of the bar.192  As a 
result of the overcrowding, there was a lot of pushing and shoving.  The 
victim, Patricia Jackson, began yelling at Hill for pushing into her.193  
Hill allegedly apologized, but Jackson continued her verbal assault and 
began to hit and elbow Hill.194  Hill admitted she yelled, “I’m sick of this 
                                                                                                                       
Id. at 114–15.  Of interest is that the court did feel bad enough that it modified the sentence from 
sixteen to ten years incarceration.  Id. at 115. 
 182. State v. Rutter, 850 P.2d 899, 904 (Kan. 1993). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (citing State v. Burgess, 781 P.2d 694, 695 (Kan. 1989)). 
 186. See id. (citing State v. Smith, 167 P.2d 594, 599 (Kan. 1946)). 
 187. See id. at 905. 
 188. See, e.g., State v. Childers, 563 P.2d 999, 1011 (Kan. 1977) (quoting Smith, 167 P.2d at 
599). 
 189. State v. Hill, 744 P.2d 1228, 1236 (Kan. 1987); see also Rutter, 850 P.2d at 903. 
 190. State v. Antwine, 607 P.2d 519, 528 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the credibility of 
the witnesses is for the jury to determine). 
 191. 744 P.2d at 1236. 
 192. Id. at 1232. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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shit,” and that she could not see Jackson’s hands.195  Hill shot Jackson 
and testified at trial that she was afraid for her life.196  The trial court 
refused to instruct on self-defense or manslaughter and the Kansas 
Supreme Court reversed.197  Acknowledging that it was not probable or 
even likely that Hill was acting in self-defense, the court stated that this 
was not the issue: 
The issue is whether there is any evidence supporting [the] defendant’s 
statement that the force she used was necessary to defend herself.  
Because, viewing all the evidence in the record in the light most 
favorable to the defendant, there is some evidence of physical 
aggression on the part of Jackson, and some evidence of a fear of 
assault on the part of the defendant, an instruction on self-defense 
should have been given.198 
In addition to the “innocent” bystander, Kansas statutes adopt, in 
some fashion, the common law rules regarding the use of self-defense by 
an aggressor.  K.S.A. 21-3214 denies the protection of self-defense to an 
aggressor who is “attempting to commit, [is] committing, or [is] escaping 
from the commission of a forcible felony.”199  Nor can a person 
intentionally provoke another as an excuse to rely on self-defense as 
protection from criminal liability.200  The only two instances in which an 
aggressor can lawfully use force against another are (1) if the aggressor 
“is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and he has 
exhausted every reasonable means to escape,”201 or (2) the aggressor 
“withdraws from physical contact . . . and indicates clearly . . . that he 
desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant 
continues or resumes the use of force.”202 
Much as it was at common law, the questions surrounding whether a 
defendant may use force when he is alleged to be the aggressor are 
incredibly fact-specific, with the decision often turning on the details.  
We begin with the threshold of “who is an aggressor?,” a question that 
Kansas places in the hands of the jury.203  In State v. Antwine, the 
                                                          
 195. Id. at 1231. 
 196. Id. at 1233. 
 197. See id. at 1233, 1236. 
 198. Id. at 1236. 
 199. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3214(1) (2007). 
 200. Id. § 21-3214(2). 
 201. Id. § 21-3214(3)(a). 
 202. Id. § 21-3214(3)(b). 
 203. State v. Adam, 896 P.2d 1022, 1029 (Kan. 1995) (citing State v. Beard, 552 P.2d 900, 903 
(Kan. 1976)) (holding that even when there is ample evidence to support a finding that the defendant 
was the aggressor, the final determination remains a jury question). 
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defendants were charged with twelve counts of aggravated robbery and 
each was convicted of one count of robbery.204  The incidents arose out 
of a dice game.205  According to the State, the defendants, armed with a 
sawed-off shotgun, robbed fourteen people who were at the game.206  
According to the defendants, they went to the game with loaded dice, 
intending to cheat; they were successful in their use of the loaded dice, 
winning cash and jewelry.207  Weber, the house man, accused them of 
cheating and pulled a gun on them; Antwine allegedly hit Weber in the 
head and the two fled the scene with the money, jewelry, and Weber’s 
gun.208  Antwine’s request that a self-defense instruction on the use of 
force that was used to elevate theft to aggravated robbery was denied.209 
In reversing the conviction on other grounds, the Kansas Supreme 
Court took time to discuss the trial court’s failure to instruct on self-
defense.210  The court held that if the jury believed that Weber pulled a 
gun on Antwine, then he was entitled to defend himself.211  The court 
stated that the State’s evidence that Antwine was committing a forcible 
felony, the aggravated robbery, was not the only evidence to be 
evaluated.212  If the jury believed the defendants’ claim that they did not 
rob the people at the game, but merely cheated them out of their money, 
the defendants were not committing a forcible felony and Antwine was 
entitled to a self-defense instruction.213 
 
                                                          
 204. 607 P.2d 519, 522 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980). 
 205. Id. at 523. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 523–24. 
 209. Id. at 523. 
 210. Id. at 526–29. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 528–29.  But cf. State v. Wells, 1 N.J.L. [Coxe] 424 (1790), reprinted in HORRIGAN & 
THOMPSON, supra note 142, at 145.  Wells was involved in a dispute with the deceased over a turkey 
that Wells believed the deceased owed him.  Id. at 146.  Wells went to the deceased’s home.  Id.  
The deceased was at the blacksmith’s, but was told by his wife which turkey Wells could have.  Id.  
Wells retrieved a different, much better, turkey and left.  Id.  Later that day, needing a shovel 
repaired, Wells went to the blacksmith’s shop where the deceased engaged him in an argument over 
the turkey.  Id. at 146–47.  The argument escalated and the deceased struck Wells, grabbed his hair 
and waist, and ran him into the corner of the shop.  Id. at 147.  The blacksmith separated the two, but 
the quarrel began again.  Id.  The deceased struck Wells and he fell against the wall.  Id.  Wells 
picked up a club and struck the deceased, killing him.  Id. 
Wells was tried and convicted of manslaughter.  Id. at 150.  His conviction was upheld on the 
grounds that he was a mutual combatant and there was no necessity for the fatal blow.  Id.  Despite 
the testimony that Wells was cornered and could not have retreated further, the court focused on the 
lack of a weapon in the deceased’s possession and that Wells “could manage the deceased as he 
pleased, and that [the deceased] was no more than a child.”  Id. at 151. 
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In those instances where the defendant is clearly the aggressor, the 
statutes and case law require the question of whether the aggressor was 
unable to escape or had withdrawn from the crime be put to the jury.  
Such is true even if the crime charged is one of felony murder.  If 
evidence exists from which the jury could conclude that the requirements 
of K.S.A. 21-3214(3) are satisfied as to the underlying felony, then the 
self-defense instruction is available to the defendant and instructions 
must be given.214 
State v. Sullivan involved a felony murder wherein the defendant was 
accused of attempting to burglarize Moore’s house when he shot and 
killed Moore’s brother.215  The State contended that Sullivan and his 
brother planned a burglary of Moore’s house and Sullivan took a gun 
with him.216  While waiting for an opportunity to enter the house, 
Sullivan shot the victim because “‘he seen me.’”217  Sullivan testified that 
he went to Moore’s house to retrieve belongings that Moore had taken 
from Sullivan’s own house.218  After waiting for an opportunity to enter 
Moore’s house, Sullivan and his brother decided to leave.219  At that 
time, Sullivan heard Moore let his dog outside.220  Sullivan knew the dog 
was a Doberman Pinscher trained to attack; when the dog advanced on 
him, he shot at it.221  He then heard somebody inside the house say that 
Lonnie, Moore’s brother, was dead.222  The trial court’s jury instruction 
denied a self-defense claim.223 
On appeal, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a self-defense 
instruction on the grounds that he took “no overt act toward a burglary,” 
that he was “withdrawing at the time that the shots were fired,” and that 
he believed he was “in imminent danger from the attack of a vicious 
trained guard dog.”224  In reversing the case, the Kansas Supreme Court 
completely bypassed the fact that the crime alleged was felony-murder, 
and held it was “a jury question whether there was a completed crime or 
a thwarted intent, unless the evidence is so conclusive as to preclude 
                                                          
 214. State v. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d 247, 272–73 (Kan. 2008) (Nuss, J., dissenting). 
 215. 578 P.2d 1108, 1114–15 (Kan. 1978). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 1115 (quoting the testimony of a third-party State witness). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1115. 
 223. Id. at 1119–20. 
 224. Id. at 1120. 
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submission of one in favor of the other.”225  Noting that the case 
presented conflicting evidence, Sullivan was “entitled to an instruction 
on [his] theory of the case even though the evidence introduced thereon 
[was] slight and supported only by defendants’ own testimony.”226 
Based on well-established self-defense jurisprudence, the recent 
Kansas Supreme Court decision in State v. Kirkpatrick is not only 
perplexing, it is wrong.  Kirkpatrick ignores decades of case law 
repeatedly holding that if there is any evidence to support self-defense, 
even if it is improbable that the jury would find in the defendant’s favor, 
the instruction must be given.227  The Kirkpatrick court’s obsession with 
the felony-murder rule does not change the analysis.  As in Sullivan, if 
there is evidence of self-defense as to the underlying felony, the 
instruction must be given.  If the court did indeed intend Kirkpatrick to 
be narrow in its holding, it failed, turning well-established Kansas 
statutes and case law “on its head.”228 
VII. RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the collision between 
Kirkpatrick and K.S.A. 21-3219 is the fact that this case law/statutory 
combination seems to reduce or eliminate the historic role the jury 
should play in deciding questions of self-defense.  The decision on the 
validity of the defense now seems to lie with law enforcement and 
prosecutors.  In those cases where the evidence of self-defense is 
conflicting, and the prosecution charges a person with a forcible felony, 
there will be serious questions about the defendant’s ability to present his 
theory of defense at trial.  These questions have constitutional 
implications. 
The jury trial is at the heart of the American adversarial system of 
criminal justice.  One foundational purpose for the jury trial is to protect 
the accused from overreaching government actors.229  The decision of a 
criminal defendant to proceed to jury trial reflects a desire both to put the 
State’s case to the constitutionally-required test of proof of each element 
beyond a reasonable doubt,230 and to have the jury, as a reflection of the 
                                                          
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 1120. 
 227. See, e.g., State v. Gayden, 910 P.2d 826, 834 (Kan. 1996) (citing State v. Hill, 744 P.2d 
1228 (Kan. 1987)). 
 228. State v. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d 247, 271 (Kan. 2008) (Nuss, J., dissenting). 
 229. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968). 
 230. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 
(1958)). 
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community, assess the validity of the defendant’s asserted defense.  A 
jury determines the fundamental questions of whether a defendant is 
criminally culpable at all and what level of culpability the State has 
proved.  A jury trial gives the defendant her basic due process guarantee 
of an opportunity to be heard.231   
Two separate constitutional provisions protect the defendant’s right 
to a trial by jury.  Article III provides that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . 
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said 
Crimes shall have been committed.”232  The Sixth Amendment 
emphasizes that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district where in the crime shall have been committed.”233  Because of 
the fundamental nature of the jury trial in the American criminal justice 
system, Duncan v. Louisiana234 incorporated the right to jury trial against 
the states.  As explained by the Court in Duncan: 
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions 
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be 
enforced and justice administered.  A right to a jury trial is granted to 
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the 
Government. . . . Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a 
jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safe guard against the corrupt 
or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or 
eccentric judge. . . . Fear of unchecked power . . . found expression in 
the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the 
determination of guilt or innocence.235 
The Court recognized that the states each have the right and 
responsibility to define crimes and punishments and to determine 
evidentiary and procedural matters.236  But the Sixth Amendment has 
specific requirements for the jury trial: for example, the rights to 
confrontation, to call witnesses, and to have the assistance of counsel.237  
Due Process requirements add other basic requirements, including the  
 
 
                                                          
 231. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (“The right of an accused in a criminal 
trial is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.”). 
 232. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 233. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 234. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 235. Id. at 155–56 (footnotes omitted). 
 236. See, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). 
 237. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
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accused’s opportunity to be heard.238  Overall, the Court finds that these 
rights ensure a person the right to present a defense.239 
Often a state’s statutes or case law will conflict with or inhibit the 
defendant’s right to present her defense.  It is at this point of conflict that 
the Court will make constitutional determinations.  In these cases, the 
Court has weighed the State’s traditional role as the arbiter of crime and 
punishment with the accused’s right to present a defense.  In the final 
analysis, in many of these cases, the State’s rule of exclusion or other 
evidentiary or procedural bar will have to yield to the defendant’s right to 
present her defense.240  The court cases discussing the defendant’s right 
to present a defense often are concerned with evidence that goes to the 
basic issue of whether or not the State is prosecuting the right person and 
whether the person is liable for the crimes charged, and whether the State 
can prohibit the introduction of exculpatory evidence.241 
Two cases illustrate the Court’s approach to resolving these 
conflicts.  In Chambers v. Mississippi, Chambers was being tried for 
killing a law enforcement officer.242  Prior to Chambers’s trial, a man 
named Gable McDonald confessed to committing the crime.243  He made 
statements to several people, including making a sworn statement to 
Chambers’s trial attorney.244  However, at the preliminary hearing, 
McDonald recanted his confession.245  At trial, Chambers wanted to 
present evidence from McDonald about his confession and evidence 
from others who heard him confess.246  Chambers was permitted to call 
McDonald and examine him.247  The State cross-examined McDonald 
about his recantation.248  On redirect, Chambers sought permission to 
treat McDonald as a hostile witness.249  The trial court denied the request, 
finding that although McDonald was hostile, he was not adverse.250  In 
addition, a Mississippi common-law rule did not permit a party to 
                                                          
 238. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294–95 (1973). 
 239. Id. 
 240. See id. at 295–98. 
 241. Id. at 302. 
 242. 410 U.S. 284, 285–86 (1973). 
 243. Id. at 287. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 288. 
 246. Id. at 291–92. 
 247. Id. at 291. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id.  The State Supreme Court also found that McDonald was not adverse “because 
‘[n]owhere did he point the finger at Chambers.’”  Id. at 291–92 (citing Chambers v. State, 252 So. 
2d 217, 220 (Miss. 1971)). 
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impeach its own witness.251  As to the other witnesses, the trial court 
refused to let them testify, finding that the testimony would be either 
inadmissible hearsay or an impermissible attempt to impeach 
Chambers’s own witness, McDonald.252  Mississippi’s hearsay rules 
recognized an exception for declarations against pecuniary interest, but 
not against penal interest.253   
 Chambers objected to all of these rulings on the constitutional 
grounds that they denied him of due process.254  The Supreme Court 
agreed: 
 The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in 
essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s 
accusations.  The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to 
call witnesses in one’s own behalf have long been recognized as 
essential to due process. . . . 
 “A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and 
an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in court—
are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a 
minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer 
testimony, and to be represented by counsel.”255 
The Court struck down the use in this case of both the “voucher rule” and 
the refusal to admit otherwise relevant evidence by “mechanistically” 
applying a state hearsay rule.256  The Court did note, however, that the 
defendant had to abide by established rules of procedure and evidence 
designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of 
guilt or innocence.257 
In Crane v. Kentucky, Crane confessed to numerous crimes, 
including the charge in this case of killing a liquor store clerk during a 
robbery.258  He moved to suppress his confession alleging that it was not 
voluntary, but the trial court, following a hearing, held that the 
confession was voluntary and admissible.259  At trial, Crane wanted to 
challenge the credibility of his confession by introducing evidence of the 
conditions in which the confession was taken.  The trial court excluded 
                                                          
 251. Id. at 295. 
 252. Id. at 292–93 n.6. 
 253. Id. at 299. 
 254. Id. at 289–90. 
 255. Id. at 294–95 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)). 
 256. Id. at 296–98, 302. 
 257. Id. at 302. 
 258. 476 U.S. 683, 684 (1986). 
 259. Id. at 684–85. 
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Crane’s evidence, finding that because it was basically the same 
evidence considered in the suppression hearing, it could not come in at 
trial.260  The Supreme Court did not find this to be a difficult case.  In a 
unanimous opinion, the Court reversed the state court’s rulings and 
stated that as part of Crane’s defense, which included drawing the 
credibility of his confession into question, he should have been permitted 
to introduce evidence relating to the conditions of his confession:261 “In 
the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of 
exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the 
prosecutor’s case encounter and ‘survive the crucible of meaningful 
adversarial testing.’”262 
Although a defendant asserting self-defense is admitting to the 
commission of an act of force, she is asserting that she is not criminally 
liable for that action and should be acquitted.  Her evidence is 
exculpatory.  Neither Kirkpatrick nor K.S.A. 21-3219 is a “valid state 
justification” for excluding a defendant’s exculpatory evidence of self-
defense.  In Kansas, all relevant evidence is admissible.263  Relevant 
evidence is that which has “any tendency in reason to prove any material 
fact.”264  Facts that go directly to the defendant’s criminal culpability are 
surely material.  Kansas’s liberal rule of admissibility is tempered by the 
statutes governing the admission and exclusion of evidence.265  In 
general, rules of evidence are an attempt to ensure that a trial is 
conducted in a manner that focuses the jury’s attention on the issue 
presented by the case, not on extraneous issues, and to ensure that 
reliable evidence is admitted.  Evidence relating to criminal culpability 
cannot be deemed extraneous. 
As discussed above, self-defense holds a place as a fundamental 
affirmative defense in Kansas.  The statutory provisions relate both to 
factual issues—whether the defendant is the initial aggressor or has 
provoked the use of force in order to respond in kind—and legal 
limitations—whether the defendant been charged with a forcible felony.  
Until K.S.A. 21-3219 and Kirkpatrick, there was no question in Kansas 
that if a defendant chose to go to trial and could produce some evidence  
 
                                                          
 260. Id. at 685–86. 
 261. Id. at 688–91. 
 262. Id. at 690–91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)). 
 263. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-407(f) (2005). 
 264. Id. § 60-401(b). 
 265. See State v. Gunby, 144 P.3d 647, 654 (Kan. 2006) (discussing admission of evidence 
under Kansas’s evidence statutes). 
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of self-defense, that most questions relating to self-defense and its 
applicability were left to the jury. 
Despite clear constitutional protection for the defendant’s right to 
present her theory of defense, the United States Supreme Court has never 
held that any particular affirmative defense must be available as a matter 
of constitutional law.  The Court has met affirmative defense issues as 
presented and many have been presented as burden of proof cases, 
assuming rather than deciding that the defense is or should be 
available.266  If state law has made the defense available, the 
constitutional questions often concern which party assumes the burdens 
of production and persuasion, and what level of proof can be placed on 
the defendant for the affirmative defense.  Although the Court has not 
addressed the constitutionality of defenses per se, the Court has accepted, 
if not expected, states to provide defenses: 
[T]he appropriate use of affirmative defenses enlarges the ameliorative 
aspects of a statutory scheme for the punishment of crime, rather than 
the other way around—a shift from primitive mechanical classifications 
based on the bare antisocial act and its consequences, rather than on the 
nature of the offender and the conditions which produce some degree of 
excuse for his conduct, the mark of an advanced criminology.267 
In Kansas, the burden of proof established for affirmative defenses 
further supports the conclusion that self-defense is a jury question.  
When the defendant asserts an affirmative defense, the burden remains 
on the State to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt.268  Evidence presented by the defendant in support of 
an affirmative defense is to be considered by the jury in making its 
determination of whether the State has met its burden.269  Because self-
defense generally requires admission of the acts that constitute the crime, 
if a jury finds the defendant appropriately used force in self-defense, then 
the defendant’s action is justified and she is acquitted. 
While not exactly on point, another line of recent United States 
Supreme Court cases has explored and reaffirmed the primacy of the jury 
in making determinations of culpability, since culpability is historically 
directly related to the resultant punishment.  These cases relate to 
                                                          
 266. See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 
210 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703 (1975). 
 267. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 212 n.13 (quoting People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909–10 
(N.Y. 1976)). 
 268. PIK CRIM. 3d § 52.08. 
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sentencing issues, the opposite end of the criminal adjudication from 
charging decisions that are implicated by K.S.A. 21-3219 and 
Kirkpatrick.  In recent years, state and federal sentencing guidelines, 
determinative, and sentencing factors have divested juries and judges of 
traditional roles in the criminal justice system.  The movement toward 
“sentencing factors,” to be proved by a mere preponderance of the 
evidence at sentencing, shifted critical issues of what a defendant is 
guilty of and how much time she should be sentenced to away from the 
jury and into the hands of the prosecutor.  Sentencing factors reduced the 
burden of proof the prosecutors had to meet to affect the sentence 
imposed.  In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that “any fact (other 
than a prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime 
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”270  Historically, all matters relating to 
criminal liability, and as a result, punishment, were for the jury.271  The 
jury is regarded as having the role of determining culpability by deciding 
whether the State has met its burden of proving all elements necessary to 
support a punishment.272  By analogy, a defendant should be able to 
present her evidence of self-defense at trial, to give the jury the 
opportunity to determine her culpability and to ensure that the State has 
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
All these cases affirm the jury’s primacy in determining all issues 
relating to culpability and the necessity of the State meeting its burden of 
proof at trial.  Analyzed under these cases, in Kansas, since evidence 
relating to self-defense relates directly to whether the State has met its 
burden of proof, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the evidence must 
be presented to the jury for its evaluation along with all other evidence.  
Kirkpatrick and K.S.A. 21-3219, if applied as the plain language would 
permit, undermine the defendant’s right to a jury trial, including the right 
to require the State to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt 
and the right to present a defense. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
While Kirkpatrick and K.S.A. 21-3219 applied together create 
troubling fundamental constitutional questions, if followed by the Kansas 
Courts, they will create a practical bar to the assertion of self-defense in 
future cases.  In the hypothetical presented at the beginning of this 
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Article, there were varying accounts of the events surrounding the 
victim’s death.  The shooter testified that he felt threatened when the 
decedent rushed him with a knife.  The shooter’s story is corroborated by 
witnesses at the scene.  But, the passengers in the car and other witnesses 
contradict the shooter’s evidence.  The case at this point appears to be a 
credibility determination, traditionally left to the jury to resolve.  Now, 
even if the evidence is conflicting on the events surrounding the 
shooter’s discharge of his gun, once the prosecutor has determined to 
proceed with the charges of felony murder and criminal discharge of a 
firearm into an occupied vehicle, the defendant no longer has the right to 
assert self-defense. 
Through a single legislative act and a single Kansas Supreme Court 
decision, Kansas law of self-defense has been altered in ways that 
undermine its historic importance, its traditional role as a jury question, 
and its availability as a defense to a person charged with a forcible 
felony.  While the policies behind the defense may have changed over 
time, Kansas has never rejected self-defense as a viable justification for 
the use of force.  If the defendant produces evidence that would support a 
finding of self-defense, the determination of whether the force was 
justified must fall to the jury in its capacity as finder of fact.  More 
importantly, the defendant has a right to have a jury hear the evidence in 
her defense and to have the jury decide on her culpability.  It is these 
factual determinations that will drive the jury’s decision on self-defense.  
Kansas cannot remove the decision about whether a defendant has a 
valid defense from the jury and simply vest it in the prosecutor’s office 
without running afoul of fundamental constitutional requirements.  
Unfortunately, this is exactly what has happened. 
 
